

Elections in Developing Countries, PSC/IR 262 Fall 2019 Syllabus

Professor:

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Office: Harkness 320B
Hours: TR 1:30-2:30

Classroom & Time: GAVETT 206, TR 11:05-12:20

Course Overview

How do elections work in developing democracies? Do contexts that are specific to countries in the developing world have implications for the nature and operation of electoral politics therein? In this course we will explore a number of issues that have particular relevance for elections in developing environments, including clientelism and vote buying, electoral manipulation and fraud, identity-based voting, and electoral violence. In addition, we will consider how limited levels of information and political credibility affect both the operation of electoral accountability and the nature of electoral competition. In doing so, we will draw on examples from Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

Lectures and Readings

There is no textbook for this course. Readings come from recent academic work on the subject, and those are available for download at the library website. Book chapters that are not available for download will be posted on blackboard.

Readings are “required”, which means that any component of them could appear in the exams. The lectures will focus on the main ideas being presented by each paper. Many of the readings, however, are quite technical. Here are a few tips on how to better read academic papers in this course:

Focus on the main idea. What is the research question being answered? How does it fit in the themes discussed so far in the course? How does it relate to the other readings? These components are usually well summarized in the first few pages.

Background. Every paper has a section explaining the context for the case study (i.e., details of the policy being evaluated, details on the country in question, etc.). Read this part carefully, so you can understand what the researcher is doing. Do not dwell on specific events, but think about how information from the case study provides insight into the broader themes of the course.

Technical sections. The empirical methodology or the mathematical model, when present, can be quite challenging. Do not focus on this part. When necessary or relevant, I will provide accessible explanations during the lectures. In order to better understand quantitative results in a paper, focus on the conclusion, where they should well summarized. Be prepared. If you do not read in advance, you might not be able to follow the lectures.

Assessment and Grading

There will be five in-class exams with 2 essay questions each. These will be taken from a list of 4 questions that will be posted (on blackboard) the day before each exam. The exams will

last 60 minutes. The scores on these will comprise 100% of your grade, and the material for each exam is non-cumulative. The weight of each exam in the final grade is as follows: lowest grade (5%), highest grade (35%), the remaining three (20% each).

Letter grades will be assigned as follows:

A 93-100

A- 85-92

B+ 80-84

B 75-79

B- 70-74

C+ 66-69

C 63-66

C- 60-62

D+ 56-59

D 53-55

D- 50-52

Fail below 50

In the exams, provide clear and concise arguments. A good answer would include your opinion, based on a thoughtful analysis of the theory and evidence presented in the readings and lectures. The more you prepare in advance, the better you will do in the exams. Also, **prepare your OWN answers in advance** (see academic honesty below). The grade for students missing exams will be zero. If a true emergency arises, contact me before the exam and I'll schedule a make-up exam.

Academic Honesty

Tempted to cheat? Don't do it. Fortunately, there are few possible opportunities for cheating in this course. Students are encouraged to talk to each other about the readings, and to study them together. The only exception is that students are **NOT ALLOWED** to share written answers to potential exam questions preceding each exam. Students should prepare their own answers. Attempting to plagiarize someone else's work in the exam (and in life!) will only make your own answers to appear shallow, weak and unoriginal. The university's academic honesty policy can be found at: <http://www.rochester.edu/college/honesty>.

Anything else

If any of this is unclear or if there are other relevant details for your situation, please contact me sooner rather than later. If you have a disability for which you may request an academic accommodation, you are encouraged to contact both myself and the access coordinator for your school to establish eligibility for academic accommodations (please see <https://www.rochester.edu/disability/students.html>). I hope this course will be an enjoyable experience for everyone.

Schedule and Readings

- Aug 28 ***No class
Sep 03 Syllabus discussion

Introduction

- Sep 05 Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. (2006). *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press. Pages 1-43.

Part I. Development, Democracy and Elections

- Sep 10 Bidner, C., Francois, P., Trebbi, F. (2015). *A Theory of Minimalist Democracies*. Working Paper. (read pages 1-9; 30-33)
- Sep 12 LaGatta, T., Little, A., Tucker, J. (2015). Elections, Protest, and Alternation of Power. *The Journal of Politics*, 77(4): 1142-56.
- Sep 17 Martinez-Bravo, M., Padró i Miquel, G., Qian, N., Yao, Y. (2018). *The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China: Evidence on the Autocrat's Trade-off*. Working paper. (read pages 1-21)
- Sep 19 Magaloni, B. (2006). *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.
- Sep 24 EXAM 1

Part II. Accountability, Information and Voting

- Sep 26 Besley, T., Burgess, R. (2002). The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (4): 1415-51
- Oct 01 Svolik, M. (2013). Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability, Government Performance, and the Consolidation of Democracy. *American Journal of Political Science*. 57(3): 685-702
- Oct 03 Campello, D., Zucco Jr., C. (2016) Presidential Success and the World Economy. *The Journal of Politics*, 78(2): 589-602
- Glaeser, E., Ponzetto, G. (2017). *Fundamental Errors in the Voting Booth*. Working Paper. (read pages 1-5)
- Oct 08 Cruz, C., Keefer, P., Labonne, J. (2018) *Buying Informed Voters: New Effects of Information on Voters and Candidates*. Working Paper.
- Oct 10 EXAM 2
- Oct 15 ***No Class

Part III. Voting and Social Identity

- Oct 17 Shayo, M. (2009). A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class and Redistribution. *American Political Science Review* 103(2): 147-174
- Oct 22 Chattopadhyay, R., Duflo, E. (2004) *Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India*. *Econometrica* 72(5): 1409-1443

- Oct 24 Woodberry, R. (2012) The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy. *American Political Science Review* 106(2): 244-274
- Chaney, E. (2013) Revolt on the Nile: Economic Shocks, Religion, and Political Power. *Econometrica* 81(5): 2033-2053
- Oct 29 Posner, D. (2013). The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi. *American Political Science Review* 98(4): 529-545
- Oct 31 EXAM 3

Part IV. Vote Buying and Clientelism

- Nov 05 Brusco, V., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., Stokes, S. (2013). *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1
- Gans-Morse, J., Mazzuca, S., Nitche, S. (2014). Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics During Elections. *American Journal of Political Science* 58: 415-32
- Nov 07 Larreguy, H., Marshall, J., Querubin, P. (2016). Parties, Brokers and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends Upon the Party's Capacity to Monitor Brokers. *American Political Science Review*, 110(1):160-179
- Nov 12 Anderson, S., Francois P., Kotwal A. (2015). Clientelism in Indian Villages. *American Economic Review* 105(6): 1780-1816
- Nov 14 Fujiwara, T., Wantchekon, L. (2013). Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 5(4): 241- 55
- Cruz, C., Keefer, P., Labonne, J., Trebbi, F. (2018) Making Policies Matter: Voter Responses to Campaign Promises. Working Paper.
- Nov 19 EXAM 4

Part V. Fraud and Violence

- Nov 21 Rundlett, A., Svolik, M. (2016). Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud. *American Political Science Review* 110(1):180-97
- Nov 26 Gehlbach, S., Simpser, A. (2015). Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic Control. *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (1): 212-24
- Nov 28 ***No class
- Dec 03 Harish, S., Little, A. (2017). The Political Violence Cycle. *American Political Science Review* 111(2): 237-55
- Dec 05 Collier, P., Vicente, P. (2014). Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria. *The Economic Journal* 124: 327-55 Chandra, K. (2005). Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability. *Perspectives on Politics* 3 (2): 235- 52
- Dec 10 EXAM 5

For W Students only

There will be a final paper of 10-12 pages, which will represent 25% of the final grade (the exams will represent 75% of the grade). The paper provides students with an opportunity to examine the topics discussed in class from the in-depth perspective of one or several empirical cases of their choosing. The paper will require W students to cite at least six academic sources not among assigned readings.

The topic is your choice, as long as it is somewhat related to the topic of this course (I am not too restrictive about your choice of topic). The paper should be comprised of three main components:

- a research question that you intend to examine. This is an introduction, the idea is to convince readers that your question is interesting and relevant.
- Context. Here you will, if necessary, provide enough information on the context of the question. For example, if your question is specific to a certain country and/or period of time. Some information the context is required for the readers to understand the paper.
- a literature review on the topic, summarizing what other people have said about the question you've posed. This is the body of the paper.
- your personal view on the subject. This is more or less like a conclusion, where you comment on the answers provided by the literature you've reviewed, and contribute with your thoughts.

The paper should be written in font size 12, one-half spacing, no more than 10 pages including a page with bibliographical references at the end (cover page does not count). In the text, you should cite at least 6 academic works that are not part of the literature being reviewed in the lectures. In the text, cite using the following format (Frey, 2019), and include the full reference in the bibliography.

Deadlines:

Anytime before **Oct 18, 2019**. Please come to my office hours with your proposed idea. We'll talk about it, and I might give you some recommendations for the literature.

Nov 23, 2019. A first draft of the paper is due, by email. After that, we'll get together again to discuss potential improvements for the final version.

Dec 13, 2019. The final version is due, by email.